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An analysis of trust in deception operations

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THESIS

AN ANALYSIS OF TRUST IN DECEPTION OPERATIONS

by

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March 2009

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AN ANALYSIS OF TRUST IN DECEPTION OPERATIONS

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

This study explores the concept of trust and its relevance to deception operations. It proposes that trust is a belief or characteristic that can be exploited or undermined to achieve a desired objective. By using a trust framework to analyze several case studies in deception, conclusions will be drawn regarding how the deception target beliefs and preconceptions affected the success of the deception and the impact or any consequences of exploiting or undermining trust.

B. RELEVANCE

Throughout history and in recent conflicts, deception has been used successfully to achieve objectives at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. There has been debate about deception—some theorists question its decisiveness, relevancy and value to a strong military, while others argue about the ethics of its use. Since a weaker adversary has the potential to prevail over a stronger opponent by using deceptive techniques, it makes such techniques a very tempting option for use against U.S. forces. Likewise, the study and practice of deception has great value to U.S. forces and should continue to be exercised. A common element in various deception theories is the need to know the enemy in order to confirm his preconceptions and beliefs with a credible deception story. This includes a thorough knowledge of his culture, norms,

and biases. Additionally, there are common human psychological traits that can aid in analysis. It is important prior to planning and executing deception operations to not only understand what the adversary is thinking, but to also understand the impact that the deception will have on the adversarial mind. A successful deception may have unintended consequences that should be considered.

C. DEFINITIONS

While trust is prevalent in human interaction and has been the subject of much research and literature across numerous disciplines, it remains a difficult concept to define. Various perspectives on the topic will be discussed; however, the case study analysis will use Piotr Sztompka's definition of trust. Sztompka (1999) defines trust as "a bet about the future contingent actions of others" (p. 25). Trust is not solely a belief, but an expectation followed by commitment or action: 'A' trusts 'B' to do (or about) 'X' in a certain context or situation. Types of commitment, expectations, context, objects of trust and grounds for trust will be examined.

Deception is also seen in all facets of human interaction throughout history, and has been the subject of numerous studies and theories. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines deception as the act of convincing someone to believe something that is false ("Deception," 2009). Military doctrine takes it one step further and mentions the objective of deception: "causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission" (Joint

Publication 3-13.4, p. vii). For the purposes of this study, a deception is an intentional act that causes the target to act. Daniel and Herbig (1982) define deception as a "deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage," (p. 3) which is a general definition for deception that applies to most instances of deception, military or not.

D. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE

The methodology of this study is to: (1) provide the reader with an overview of the topic of trust, focusing on Piotr Sztompka's concept of trust as a framework for analysis, (2) examine various theories of deception in order to clarify the relevance of trust to deception operations, (3) examine various case studies from a trust perspective, particularly focusing on how exploiting or undermining trust may have played a role in the success of the deception, and (4) draw conclusions regarding the effect on future operations and the relevancy of trust to the deception, as well as the end objectives.

It is impossible to fully understand what a deception target is thinking when presented with a deception story. He may act according to preconceptions and biases, or because he thinks that it is in his best interests to do so, or for some reason that may be contradictory to what one might expect. A deception planner will never have the same picture that the target has, or know exactly which information the target will accept, refuse or miss. Causality is also difficult to ascertain.

Some trust theories focus on trust being a belief and not an action. This study, however, will use Sztompka's definition of trust—that trust consists of a belief or expectation that is followed by a commitment or action by the target—a bet (1999). The intent is to examine the trust that a deception target may have placed in a person, channel and/or message and how that contributed to the target's deception. The final case study will look at an example of how trust can be damaged intentionally, or undermined, by deception.

E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provides an overview and introduction. The second chapter of this thesis presents an overview of trust. Several concepts of trust are presented, with a short description of the limitations of each. Next, the definition and trust model to be used in the case study analysis will be presented. The third chapter presents an overview of deception, both from the military and academic perspectives. The importance of the adversarial mind to a successful deception is emphasized. The intent of this chapter is to present the reader with a discussion of why trust is relevant in discussions of deception. The fourth chapter presents several case studies and analyzes them using the trust framework presented in chapter one. In all of the case studies, the target of the deception placed trust in certain individuals, channels or messages, which made them vulnerable to deception and exploitation of trust. The final case is an example of how deception was also used to undermine trust in an organization. Chapter V offers

conclusions and insights about how consideration of trust can be helpful to the planning and analysis of deception operations and how exploitation or the undermining of trust may affect future operations.

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II. TRUST

A. BACKGROUND OF TRUST

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines trust as assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something, one in which confidence is placed, or the dependence on something future or contingent (“Trust,” 2009). Trust has been recognized as essential in human interactions. Good (1988) notes “...the clear and simple fact that, without trust, the everyday social life which we take for granted is simply not possible” (Sztompka, 1999, p. ix). Despite a general consensus of the prevalence of trust and distrust in human interactions, there are many different definitions and conceptions as to what trust is.

Trust has recently been the focus of research and studies across several disciplines. “For the last decade or so, the problem of trust has come to the fore of sociological attention” (Sztompka, 1999, p. ix). Several works discuss the reasons that the topic of trust has gained interest in the last decade. One proposed reason that reliance on trust has increased in today’s world is that “the dependence of society’s future on decision making has increased” (Luhmann, 1994, p. xii). Sztompka (1999) also attributes the increased demand for and focus on trust to the growing interdependency of our world, “As our dependence on the cooperation of others grows, so does the importance of trust in their reliability” (p. 12). Other compelling reasons to consider trust focus on the complexity, ignorance and uncertainty that exist. Increasing technological

complexity can result in unpredictability and unintended consequences, and coping with that raised vulnerability in the "risk society" requires an enlarged pool of trust (Sztompka, 1999). Additionally, Sztompka (1999) mentions several factors that increase the uncertainty and complexity of society and cause an increased reliance on trust: the number of options that exist; the "opaqueness and complexity of institutions, organizations, and technological systems"; the "anonymity and impersonality of those we depend on"; and "the growth of unfamiliar people in our environment" (p. 13-14). Gambetta (2000) notes: "The condition of ignorance or uncertainty about other people's behavior is central to the notion of trust" (p. 218).

B. CONCEPTIONS OF TRUST

Despite considerable effort to define trust, "a concise, universally accepted definition or conception of trust has remained elusive" (Kramer, 1999, p. 571). A common thread in most conceptions of trust is that it is a psychological state (Kramer, 1999). This section will give a brief overview of several conceptions of trust in the social sciences.

1. Trust as a Psychological State

One theory of trust views it as a psychological state rather than a choice or behavior. Some conceptualizations of trust as a psychological state focus on cognitive orientations such as vulnerability and risk due to uncertainty in interactions with others (Kramer, 1999). Other definitions emphasize the attitude or expectations that people have about others and the social system in which

they exist (Kramer, 1999). Rousseau et al. (1998) defines trust as follows: “Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (p. 395).

2. Trust as a Rational Choice

Several trust theorists treat trust as a choice behavior. In rational-choice theory of trust, both the truster and trustee are rational actors attempting to maximize their respective gains by rational calculations utilizing available information (Sztompka, 1999). “From the perspective of rational choice theory, decisions about trust are similar to other forms of risky choice; individuals are presumed to be motivated to make rational, efficient choices...”(Kramer, 1999, p. 572). The rational choice model of trust is useful because it focuses on behavior—trust decisions are observable behaviors (Kramer, 1999). Gambetta (1988) writes:

> When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him. (p. 217)

Hardin presents an encapsulated interest theory, which considers both the knowledge that enables one to trust another and the incentive of the person trusted (trustee) to fulfill the trust. In the encapsulated interest theory, the truster believes the trustee will fulfill his expectation because it will be in the trustee’s own interest to do so (2006).

One commonality of trust exchanges is the presence of uncertainty or risk. Without uncertainty or risk, making a bet by trusting another person would be unnecessary. Placing a bet of trust is made to maximize gain and minimize loss. Coleman notes:

> If the chance of losing, relative to the chance of winning is greater than the amount that would be won (if he wins), relative to the amount that would be lost (if he loses), then by abstaining from the bet he has an expected gain; and if he is rational, he would withdraw trust. (paraphrased in Sztompka, 1999, p. 61)

Criticism of the rational-choice theory and its application to disciplines such as sociology and psychology focuses on certain human behavior that deviates from rationality. Theorists such as Cook and Emerson (1978) "show that the norms of trust and justice that individuals use in their actions have a moral force that runs counter to purely rational considerations" (Browning et al., 2000, p. 134). Cultural norms also are an important factor in trusting, and are problematic in viewing trust as a purely rational act—"Normative rules in the cultural context also encourage or discourage trusting, and are not sufficiently explained by the rational choice model of trust or in a psychological view of trust" (Sztompka, 1999, p. 66). The rational choice view of trust also suggests the need for complete knowledge of an individual's trustworthiness and the risks involved.

3. Trust as Moral

The basis for the moral conception of trust is that trust extends beyond trusting those that we know well and

deem trustworthy. A moral concept of trust explains the fact that we do trust strangers, without sufficient knowledge to make an informed, rational decision to trust. In this view, trust is independent of personal knowledge, experience or previous interactions. In his book "The Moral Foundations of Trust," Eric Uslaner (2002) argues that "we must have positive views of strangers, of people who are different from ourselves and *presume that they are trustworthy*" (p. 2). Unlike theories that argue trust is a choice toward someone we deem trustworthy, or that focus on instrumental or strategic reasons why one should trust another (p. 3), the moral conception of trust is not based on the truster's experience but on the belief that "most people can be trusted" (p. 3).

The concept of trust as a moral value is criticized in other writings on trust for its conclusion that society would be better off it people were more trusting. Hardin (2006) and Gambetta (2000) both cite examples of how sometimes less trust is desirable, as placing trust in the wrong hands can be dangerous.

4. Non-Cognitive Trust

Uncertainty may make it impossible to make a rational calculation of the risks of placing trust. Another theory of trust, non-cognitive trust, is a theory that seeks to explain some of the more irrational instances of trust. Non-cognitive trust is difficult to explain with any theory-non-cognitive trust includes learned behaviors, but also physiological contributions to trust. This view is addressed

in Becker (1996) and Jones (1996). Lawrence Becker (1996) makes this distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive trust:

> Let us call our trust 'cognitive' if it is fundamentally a matter of our beliefs or expectations about others' trustworthiness; it is non-cognitive if it is fundamentally a matter of our having trustful attitudes, affects, emotions, or motivational structures that are not focused on specific people, institutions or groups. (p. 50)

Where cognitive theories of trust express A trusts B to do X in situation S, non-cognitive trust would express A's attitude toward B as X, or A's attitude toward B is trustful (Becker, 1996, p. 45). Non-cognitive trust is trust in a person independent of our "beliefs or expectations of their trustworthiness" (Becker, 1996, 50).

Non-cognitive trust is a personality trait or quality of the person placing the trust, and not a relationship or exchange between the parties (Sztompka, 2001, p. 65). A criticism of defining trust as a non-cognitive characteristic is noted by Hardin (2002), who points out the difficulty in separating non-cognitive trust from cognitive trust, and the limited utility in explanation of any behavior (p. 69).

C. SZTOMPKA'S DEFINITION AND TRUST FACTORS

In *Trust: A Sociological Theory*, Piotr Sztompka takes stock of the existing conceptions of trust and provides "conceptual and typological clarifications...of the notion of trust" (p. x). The resulting trust theory addresses the uncertainty, vulnerability, and risk of our interactions

with others—characteristics that make trust necessary. The trust theory proposed recognizes that making a bet of trust is not always a rational choice—often one must resort to expectations, clues of trustworthiness, and in psychological or cultural phenomena such as trusting impulse or trust culture when placing trust.

Sztompka (1999) defines trust as "a bet about the future contingent actions of others" (p. 25). The act of trusting consists of two main components: beliefs about how someone will perform in the future and commitment, or the action of placing the bet on the anticipated performance (Sztompka, 1999, p. 25). Similarly, Sztompka treats distrust as the "negative mirror-image of trust" and a "negative bet" (p. 26).

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a bet as "something that is laid, staked, or pledged typically between two parties on the outcome of a contest or a contingent issue, a wager, the act of giving such a pledge" ("bet," 2009). Placing a bet requires some expectation of the outcome, usually involving a favorable outcome for the person placing the bet. Sztompka mentions two types of expectations involved in bets of trust—reciprocity and benign conduct (1999). Reciprocity is the expectation that the trust conferred will be fulfilled, and even returned, to the truster (Sztompka, 1999). Benign conduct is the type of expectation involved when the conduct of the trustee is completely independent of the trust placed in them (Sztompka, 1999). One bases their trust on a certain expectation of an individual, but the individual will act or perform the same, regardless of whether trusted or not.

Sztompka focuses on the second category, expectations of benign conduct, and describes three types of these expectations: instrumental, axiological and fiduciary.

1. Types of Expectations

a. Instrumental Expectations

Instrumental trust is based on the expectations that actions taken by the target of trust will exhibit certain qualities, regardless of the trust placed in them. Examples of instrumental expectations are: regularity, or the expectation that an individual or object's performance will be consistent; reasonableness; and efficiency (Sztompka, 1999). Some instrumental expectations incur more risk than others (Sztompka, 1999).

b. Axiological Expectations

Axiological trust is based on the expectation that actions performed by others will exhibit certain moral qualities. These qualities vary in risk, and include the expectation that a target of trust will be morally responsible, kind and humane, truthful, fair and just (Sztompka, 1999). Sztompka notes that these expectations are more demanding and incur greater risk, "generally speaking, betting on the moral virtues of others is more risky than believing in their basic rationality" (p. 54).

c. Fiduciary Expectations

The third type of expectation—fiduciary refers to the expectation that the trusted will act in a manner that places the interests of the trusted before their own

(Sztompka, 1999, p. 54). Fiduciary often refers to a person who is entrusted with something, often money, and is expected to act in good faith and sometimes against his or her own interests to benefit the interests of the truster (Sztompka, 1999). Sztompka notes three examples of fiduciary behavior: disinterestedness, representative actions, benevolence and generosity (p. 54). A bet based on fiduciary expectation is particularly risky; people will more likely act rationally or morally than place interests of another person above their own.

2. Types of Commitment

According to Sztompka (1999), trusting involves three types of commitment: anticipatory, responsive, and evocative. Anticipatory trust is the trust involved in a bet that our needs and interests will be met by others "just doing what they normally routinely do" (p. 27). Examples of this type of trust may be the trust we confer in doctors, law enforcement personnel, politicians, etc. "It does not imply an obligation on the part of the trusted, who may not even be aware of the trust placed in her" (Hardin, 1991, p. 198). Sztompka (1999) defines responsive trust as a bet that requires a "specific, voluntary obligation to care" on the part of the trusted; "entrusting some valuable object to somebody else, with his or her consent; giving up one's control over that object...and expecting responsible care" (p. 26). The third type of commitment, or evocative trust, is when we act on the belief that our trust will be reciprocated (Sztompka, 1999). These three types of commitment can be present in various degrees and strengths.

3. Objects of Trust

There are several primary objects, or targets, of trust: others that we come into contact with (interpersonal trust); people that we do not come into direct contact with (social trust); social categories (groups of people sharing common traits); social roles (ways of acting typical for specific positions); social group ("plurality of persons kept together by specific social bonds"); institutions and organizations; technological systems; products and utensils that we purchase and use; and finally, the most abstract—overall qualities of the social system, social order, or the regime (Sztompka, 1999, p. 43). Additionally, there are secondary objects of trust, such as witnesses, experts, and "agents of accountability" that are relied upon in bets of trust on the objects mentioned above (Sztompka, 1999).

4. Grounds for Trust

Often, when an individual must make a decision about whether to trust, the trustworthiness of the trustee is not known. In this situation, a truster must look for cues to aid in the decision. Sztompka presents several cues that encourage people to trust or distrust, or to choose specific types of trust. Luhmann (1979) notes:

> The cues employed to form trust do not eliminate the risk, they simply make it less. They do not supply complete information about the likely behavior of the person to be trusted. They simply serve as a springboard for the leap into uncertainty. (as cited in Sztompka, 1999, p. 69)

Three grounds on which decisions to grant or withhold trust may be based on are: reflected trustworthiness, agential trustfulness or derived trustworthiness, and trust culture (Sztompka, 1999).

a. Reflected Trustworthiness

Reflected trustworthiness is perhaps the most important and most common ground for trust, and is based on the perceived trustworthiness of the trustee (Sztompka, 1999). The estimated trustworthiness of a potential target of trust can be based on reputation, performance and/or appearance.

Trust may be based on the reputation of the potential target of trust or the record of their past performance with regard to trust. Reputation may be either first- or second-hand, and may refer to past conduct, instances of meeting trust, or reciprocating trust (Sztompka, 1999, p. 72). Often an individual does not have first-hand knowledge of a potential trustee, and may rely on clues such as testimonies, credentials, references, social proof, recommendations, etc. (Sztompka, 1999). As with the other clues of trustworthiness, reputation is able to be manipulated- credentials can be faked, reviews and recommendations can be exaggerated, and second-hand sources may be wrong.

The second category of reflected trustworthiness is performance. Unlike reputation, which considers a potential target’s past trustworthy behavior, performance is concerned with current deeds, conduct and results (Sztompka, 1999, p. 77). There are many situations in which looking at

present performance is more effective in assessing the potential trustworthiness of a target. This basis for trust can be manipulated, as an individual may act in a manner inconsistent with their reputation, or out of character to achieve a certain objective. Some financial scams may use actual or inflated current performance to deceive a potential target into investing their life savings.

Appearance is the third type of reflected trustworthiness. There are two broad categories that provide indications of personality, identity and status and thus provide cues to trust: appearance and demeanor (Sztompka, 1999). When deciding whether to place trust, cues such as dress, cleanliness, self-conduct, age, gender, race, possessions, status and demeanor play a large part. People tend to trust individuals similar to themselves, or those who look authoritative or even attractive (Sztompka, 1999). Like Reputation and performance, appearance can also be deceiving. There are many examples of appearance being used to increase an individual's perceived trustworthiness in order to deceive another. Status and authority are often used in advertising and scams. Law enforcement personnel go undercover or in disguise to catch criminals. Whaley and Samter (2006) note that the manipulation of nonverbal behavior explains why some people are successful liars. "Research suggests that successful liars are those who maintain eye contact, display a forward body lean, smile, and orient their bodies toward the other person" (p.55).

b. Derived Trustworthiness

In addition to the three bases of primary trustworthiness, trust can also be grounded in external

factors that have influence on trustworthiness. Sztompka refers to these trust enhancing conditions as ‘derived trustworthiness’ and includes three types: accountability of the trustees, pre-commitment, and trust-inducing situations (Sztompka, 1999, p. 87).

Accountability refers to the “enforcement of trustworthiness” by external monitoring of the trustee’s conduct (Sztompka, 1999, p. 87). Accountability can be provided by formal or informal means, and encourages an individual to be trustworthy by insuring trustworthy behavior and punishing breaches of trust. Contracts, guarantees, agreements, and informal understandings are all types of accountability that can aid in making a bet of trust (Sztompka, 1999). The second type of derived trustworthiness, pre-commitment, is a special case of accountability where a trustee willingly restrains his actions in order to increase trustworthiness (Sztompka, 1999, p. 91). This could involve voluntarily reducing one’s freedom or rights in a contract, paying membership dues, or paying a refundable deposit to borrow an item or rent property. Finally, there are other cues to aid in the decision of whether to trust that are situational. There are certain environments that make one more or less likely to assess a potential trustee as trustworthy. Small, close-knit communities are more conductive to trust than societies where secrecy and anonymity are prevalent; sacred settings such as churches are more so than subway stations, and locations such as a highway, where a breach of trust may be devastating to the trustee, more so than a more benign setting (Sztompka, 1999). These three cues for trust facilitate trust in certain situations when the truster may

not otherwise trust the trustee to do X, such as when an assessment of trustworthiness is not possible.

c. Trusting Impulse

In addition to the estimation of trustworthiness that a truster makes, there is an additional ground for trust that stems from the psychological tendency to trust. This is referred to as a "trusting impulse" (Sztompka, 1999). The tendency to trust or distrust is formed through an individual's accumulated experiences of having trust met or breached (Sztompka, 1999).

d. Trust Culture

Trust can also be grounded in the values or norms of a culture. Trust culture is not based on the experiences or psychological disposition of an individual, but rather the collective or typical experiences of members of a given culture over a long period of time (Sztompka, 1999, p. 99). Over time, trust culture is formed through a society's accumulated negative or positive experiences with trust. Sztompka gives five societal circumstances that contribute to trust culture: normative coherence, stability of the social order, transparency of the social order, familiarity of the environment and the accountability of other people and institutions (1999). These characteristics of the culture coupled with the societal mood and collective capital result in the formation of a trust culture (Sztompka, 1999).



Figure 1. Representation of Sztompka's Trust Model

5. Trust Model Based on Sztompka's Concept of Trust

Sztompka's concept of trust is useful for this study because it provides a clear framework based on evolving trust research, and incorporates three dimensions of trust: trust as relationship, trust as a personality trait and trust as a cultural phenomenon. Despite the fact that humans are rational beings and often act toward fulfilling self-interest in rational ways, factors such as psychological biases and cultural factors also have a large impact on whether a person trusts or not. It is not always possible to assess one's trustworthiness prior to making a bet of trust; in many instances, one must rely on various expectations and cues to lessen the risk.

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III. THE ROLE OF TRUST IN A DECEPTION

A. BACKGROUND OF DECEPTION

Deception is defined as the act of deceiving, or the act of convincing another to believe information that is false (*"deception,"* 2008). Caddell (2004) notes, "deception is a traditional component of political and military conflict," and like trust it is also "intrinsic to human interaction" (p. 1). Latimer (2001) notes that "everyone employs deception at times, either to gain an advantage or for more altruistic reasons...deception is such an integral part of our lives that we often fail to recognize it" (p. 1).

Deception in warfare is likely as old as warfare itself (Caddell, 2004). History from biblical times forward is replete with examples of how deception enabled victory—often by a weaker force. Some of the most dramatic, large-scale deceptions are those that took place during World War II, such as Operation Bodyguard. Deception can still be used effectively today. A few of the more recent examples include deceptions during the Six-Day War of 1967, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Hezbollah's use of deception against Israeli Forces in Lebanon, deception during Desert Storm, Kosovo, and the 2008 Colombian hostage rescue. In addition to deception in warfare, there are many examples of political deceptions, deceptions by other agencies such as the FBI and CIA, and deceptions by various other groups, organizations and individuals.

B. PRINCIPLES OF DECEPTION

Generally, deception involves techniques such as camouflage, concealment, feints, demonstrations, ruses and displays to convey selected information to the adversary with the objective of gaining an advantage. Deception occurs at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare. Deception can be passive, consisting of camouflage and concealment, or active, conveying certain information or indicators to the adversary. Most theories of deception recognize the importance of knowing the adversary—including his preconceived beliefs, expectations, thought processes, and channels of information. Other factors such as security, secrecy and credibility of the deception story are common to most literature on deception. This section will introduce both military and academic theories of deception and discuss their relevance to trust.

1. JP 3-13.4 Military Deception

Military deception doctrine defines MILDEC as "those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission" (*Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.4,* 2006, p. vii). There are six principles to MILDEC: focus, objective, centralized planning and control, security, timeliness and integration. Focus refers to the targeting of adversarial decision makers—using conduits or channels that will affect their information, information systems and decision-making. Conduits refer to the systems,

organizations and individuals through which information reaches the adversarial decision maker (*JP 3-13.4,* 2006). MILDEC planning doctrine focuses on the adversary's behavior, and proposes a "See, Think, Do" Deception Methodology (*JP 3-13.4,* 2006, p. IV-1). This concept is a "cognitive process in the target's mind that leads to target decisions that result in adversary actions that are advantageous to the (deception planners)" (*JP 3-13.4*, 2006, IV-1). This methodology is shown in Figure 1.



Figure 2. Military Deception as a Three-Tiered Cognitive Process (From JP 3-13.4)

2. Daniel and Herbig, "Propositions on Military Deception"

Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig define deception as the "deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage" (1982, p. 155). This theory of

deception emphasizes the role of the receiver in the deception—in order for one to be deceived one must believe the false story that is being told. Furthermore, three goals of a deception are presented: to condition a target's beliefs, to influence the target's actions, and to benefit the deceiver from the target's actions (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 157). This is similar to the JP 3-13.4 three-tiered cognitive process above.

Daniel and Herbig distinguish two types of deception, "A-type" or "ambiguity-increasing," and "M-type," or "misleading." Deceptions do not have to be limited to one or the other, and can have elements of both. The objective of A-type deceptions is to increase uncertainty and prevent an adversary from determining the deceiver's goal or intentions. It is not sufficient for the falsehoods of an A-type deception to simply disseminate indicators and information—they must be "plausible enough and consequential enough to the target's well-being that the target cannot ignore them" (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 157). "M-type" deceptions decrease ambiguity by causing a deception target to focus on one wrong alternative (Daniel & Herbig, 1982). One example of a successful M-type deception was Fortitude South. This was the deception during WWII to convince Hitler that the Allied Forces main effort would be in Pas de Calais, and that Normandy was just a diversionary attack.

Daniel and Herbig's theory makes a distinction from other theories in their assertion that the initial target of a military deception is usually a state's intelligence organization (1982), though they do recognize the decision maker as the ultimate deception target. Figure 2 shows the

channels that link the deceiver and the target. These channels make deception possible, and may include conduits such as a newspaper or radio channel monitored by the target, reconnaissance satellites, electronic intercept systems, diplomats or spies (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 159). The deceiver sends signals and planted clues and evidence through these channels to the target. (See Figure 2) There are several possibilities for the signals transmitted through these channels, they may be received intact, garbled, modified, misinterpreted or dismissed (Daniel & Herbig, 1982). A deceiver must expect that some of the signals may not make it to the target, may be misinterpreted or discarded (Daniel & Herbig, 1982). Feedback channels, (Figure 2) if present, may help determine the effectiveness of the signals.

Daniel and Herbig (1982) also discuss five categories conditioning the success of deception: Secrecy, organization, and coordination; plausibility and confirmation; adaptability; predispositions of the target; and factors in the strategic situation (p. 167).



Figure 3. The Process of Deception (After Figure 1.2, Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 160)

3. Barton Whaley

In *Toward a General Theory of Deception,* Barton Whaley presents what he refers to as the "first comprehensive attempt at deception theory," which is based on analysis of two fields in which deception is prevalent: the military and magic (Whaley, 1982, p. 178). Regardless of the field, Whaley asserts that all deceptions are applied psychology, specifically the "psychology of misperception," and therefore can be addressed in a general theory (1982). Whaley (1982) defines deception as information designed to manipulate the behavior of others by inducing them to accept

a false or distorted presentation of their environment. Deceptions consist of two parts, simulation and dissimulation. Dissimulation refers to hiding the real; simulation involves showing the false (1982). Whaley (1982) notes that both simulation and dissimulation are present in all deceptions. Dissimulation can be divided into three categories: masking, repackaging and dazzling. Similarly, simulating can be categorized as mimicking, inventing or decoying. Whaley proposes a process of deception that consists of ten steps: knowing the strategic goal, deciding the desired reaction and the desired perception, deciding what to hide and what to show, analyzing the pattern to be hidden and the pattern to be shown, exploring the means available, handing off the plan to operational units, communicating through target channels, and the acceptance of the deception by the target (pp. 188-189).

4. Walter Jajko

In *Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to Planning*, Jajko defines deception as "the manipulation of an opponent through the employment of stratagem" (p. 353). Jajko (2002) points to surprise as a key element in gaining advantage over an adversary, although an adversary's vulnerabilities provide the potential for deception (p. 353).

Like other deception theorists, Jajko notes that the target of a deception is the adversarial decision maker, specifically the decision-maker's mind. Deception is inherently psychological as it creates and reinforces perceptions, and "affects the cognitive, emotional and motivational processes," but its objective is to provoke

action or inaction through the use of simulation or dissimulation (Jajko, 2002). The overall objectives of a deception are to hide friendly weaknesses and intentions, exaggerate strength, and to cause the enemy to misdirect strength, increase uncertainty or confirm certainty (Jajko, 2002). In order to create or reinforce the adversary's perceptions, the deception must be "credible, verifiable and feasible" (Jajko, 2002, p. 354).

Much of Jajko's focus is on the United States' reluctance to accept and use deception in political and military conflict despite its power and value. Five essential conditions for the sustained ability to conduct deception are listed: apparatus, policy, philosophy, practitioners, and practice (Jajko, 2002, p. 354). Perhaps most relevant to this study of doctrine is Jajko's six steps of the planning process. A rigid, meticulous, six-step process is outlined, consisting of the following steps: (1) determine purposes and objectives, (2) establish why deception is warranted, (3) make a thorough assessment of the target, (4) develop a deception strategy, (5) produce a detailed schedule, and (6) ensure that the conclusion of the deception is planned for (Jajko, 2002).

Jajko (2002) notes the importance of assessing the adversary, particularly his expectations and inclinations:

> One must understand the ethnic, intellectual, and ethical wells of his understanding. It must be remembered that the adversary's perceptions, his view of reality, his understanding of the available information and of one's motivation will be determined in part by his language, history, geography, education, experience, modernity, methods, doctrines, beliefs, values, and vanities, in short, his culture and

> psychology—and his religion or ideology—which often are disregarded by those in a secular and pluralistic society. (p. 359)

This illustrates perhaps the biggest challenge in planning and conducting a deception operation. The tendency to “mirror-image” can lead to self-deception; understanding is critical. A variety of methods may be necessitated to gain an understanding of the deception target.

5. Richard Heuer, “Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counterdeception”

Heuer (1981) states, “To be successful, deception must achieve a desired impact upon the thinking of the deception target, either a national or military decision maker...” (p. 1) In order to accomplish this goal, one must understand the thought processes of the target. Richard Heuer’s analysis focuses on examining common perceptual biases and tendencies. Because people lack the capability to deal with all the complexities of the world, simplifying strategies are employed to make judgments and decisions. Often these perceptions diverge from reality and can be referred to as biases, or predictable errors in judgment (Heuer, 1981). Heuer’s analysis is limited to discussion of perceptual and cognitive bias. His intent is to examine how to exploit this knowledge by deceiving and how to prevent being deceived (Heuer, 1981, p. 33).

One’s perception of reality is influenced by a number of factors that include past experience, education, values, and role requirements as well as other stimuli (Heuer, 1981). Central to Heuer’s discussion of perceptual bias is the principle that people perceive what they expect to

perceive. Expectations are based on various experiences, training, norms, situations and influences. “Patterns of expectation, rooted in past experience and training, tell us, subconsciously, what to look for, what is important, and how to interpret what we see” (Heuer, 1981, p. 35). These patterns are referred to as a “mind-set”. Heuer notes that a mind-set is unavoidable and is resistant to change; new information is conditioned by existing perceptions and old perceptions are hard to lose (Heuer, 1981, p. 37).

Heuer (1981) examines several cognitive biases: biases in estimating probabilities, availability bias, anchoring bias, overconfidence bias, and bias toward causal explanation. Availability bias is a probability estimate that is based on how easily one can recall or imagine an event (Heuer, 1981). This ability to imagine a certain scenario is limited by part experience or memories of a similar scenario. Anchoring bias involves the selection of a natural, approximate starting judgment around which further information and analysis is “anchored” (Heuer, 1981). Overconfidence bias is a result of people thinking that they are more certain than they actually are Heuer, 1981).

Each of these biases has the potential to be exploited in deceptions. As mentioned by several theorists, it is much easier to reinforce what the target believes rather than to change their mind. Availability bias may make a target believe that deception is more common than it is and be more inclined to perceive it (Heuer, 1981). This seems to be the case with the Germans while Operation Mincemeat in WWII was very fresh in their memory.

Heuer also notes “impressions tend to persist even after the evidence that created those impressions is fully discredited” (Heuer, 1981, p. 53). This explains why “impressions created from information passed by a channel such as a double agent may persist even after it is revealed that the source cannot be trusted” (Heuer, 1981).

C. MANIPULATING TRUST THROUGH DECEPTION

This section examines two objectives of using deception to manipulate trust: (1) creating trust in a deception target when that trust is not deserved, and (2) undermining existing trust relationships in target networks.

1. Creating Trust for the Purpose of Exploitation

Sztompka’s referral to trust as a bet implies that there is risk involved in trusting. And with any bet, there is a chance of losing. There is always a chance in placing our trust in someone, that we may make a mistake or be taken advantage of. “Placing trust, that is, making bets about the future uncertain and uncontrollable actions of others, is always accompanied by risk” (Kollock, 1994, p. 317).

Some of the reasons for our increased reliance on trust that were mentioned earlier;complexity, uncertainty, and increased technology increase the risks of trusting and the possibility of deception. In his book *Influence: the Psychology of Persuasion*, Robert Cialdini writes:

> Because technology can evolve much faster than we can, our natural capacity to process information is likely to be increasingly inadequate to handle the surfeit of change, choice, and challenge that is characteristic of modern life... When making a decision, we will less frequently enjoy the

> luxury of a fully considered analysis of the total situation but will revert increasingly to a focus on a single, usually reliable feature of it. (Cialdini, 1993, p. 278)

Cialdini (1993) notes a possible hazard in trusting in these cues: “the problem comes when something causes the normally trustworthy cues to counsel us poorly, to lead us to erroneous actions and wrongheaded decisions” (p. 278).

As mentioned earlier, there are certain expectations or cues that trust can be based on. Sztompka (1999) mentions three types of expectations that trust may be based on: instrumental, moral or axiological. Each of these expectations involves a certain degree of risk, and brings with it the possibility of deception. Instrumental expectations involve expectations of benign conduct, such as the trustee acting reasonably, efficiently, etc. (1999). Expectations involving moral qualities are a little riskier. One can trust their spouse to be truthful or trust a politician to not embezzle, but frequently these expectations are taken advantage of by liars or deceivers. Finally, fiduciary or axiological expectations are the riskiest of all. Encouraging a person to expect that someone is concerned about the person’s welfare more than their own, or that they are acting in the person’s best interest rather than for self-serving purposes are two ways that a person’s fiduciary expectations may be taken advantage of. Manipulating a person’s expectations so that they trust you to do one thing (act in good faith, for example), and instead you do something else (cheat) is the basis for most deception.

In *Strategic Denial and Deception*, Godson and Wirtz note that diplomatic channels can be effective for deception. Diplomats have to be able to do some amount of business with each other, which requires some degree of trust. As a result, personal relationships that facilitate this activity result, and despite the fact that a diplomat may represent an adversary country, he may be thought of as "not such a bad fellow," and unlikely to tell an outright lie (Godson and Wirtz, 2002, pp. 21-22). Godson and Wirtz (2002) write, "this creates the possibility of passing false signals that will, nevertheless, be believed" (p. 22). The expectation that diplomatic activity is occurring may also present opportunities for exploitation. Godson and Wirtz (2002) point out that in late 1941,

> Japanese diplomats in Washington were continuing to negotiate even as the rest of their government prepared to launch an attack on U.S. forces at Pearl Harbor. This served a deceptive purpose, since it suggested that Japan had not yet taken the decision to go to war against the United States. (p. 22)

Coincidentally, Stalin also managed to reinforce Japanese expectations of a negotiation of terms in 1945 when he sent messages through diplomatic channels in response to a Japanese invitation to be a party to negotiating a conditional surrender between Japan and the Allies (Godson & Wirtz, 2002, p. 85). The negotiations led to the Japanese expectation of a negotiation or perhaps an ultimatum on August 8, 1945, but not a declaration of war (Godson & Wirtz, 2002, p. 85).

Gaining one’s confidence in order to defraud or deceive is sometimes referred to as a confidence game or trick. Although this type of fraud has probably been in existence forever, the term “confidence man” came into use in the 1800s. Often appeals to one’s weaknesses such as greed or vanity are used, but virtues such as honesty, or the expectation of good faith are also susceptible (“confidence trick,” 2009). Victor Lustig must have gained the trust of the French businessmen when he successfully “sold” the Eiffel Tower in 1925 (“Victor Lustig,” 2009); similarly, George Parker when he sold various New York City landmarks to tourists (Cohen, 2005).

An individual may look to certain cues such as appearance, performance or reputation to assess trustworthiness. Frequently these cues are used to gain the confidence of a truster. In *Trust and Trustworthiness*, Hardin uses an example from the movie *Six Degrees of Separation* of how the main character (based on the life of David Hampton) was able to learn enough about his targets and their families to cause them to consider their relationship with him as involving trust and trustworthiness (Hardin, 2006, p. 81). He led them to believe that he was a "good college friend of their children, and they therefore treated him as such" (p. 81). Hardin writes:

> The trustworthiness they assumed of him was... they thought, reputational, because it was grounded in what they thought to be the judgment of their own children and in the scam artist’s ongoing relationship with those children. (p. 81)

In *The Art of Deception*, Kevin Mitnick credits the success of social engineering attacks to the vulnerability of human beings to being deceived into misplacing trust by manipulation. “The social engineer anticipates suspicion and resistance, and he’s always prepared to turn distrust into trust...One of his common techniques involves building a sense of trust on the part of his victim” (Mitnick, 2002, p. 41). A social engineer anticipates what a target may ask, and can plan his responses to what the target will expect, decreasing the chance a target will become suspicious. In the examples that Mitnick presents, social engineers clearly use trust cues such as those Sztompka mentions to increase the appearance of trustworthiness to the target. Sztompka lists various ways in which these cues (and trust) can be manipulated: the glorification of reputation (by historic deeds or miracles performed), fabricating credentials (medals, degrees, etc), exaltation of performance, and aggrandizing appearance (ornate, decorated uniforms, for example) or impressing with props or possessions (1999). Bell and Whaley (1991) mention four “shortcuts” to a doctorate: false claim, faking documentation, plagiarism, and purchasing one (p. 226). A doctorate is regarded as a valuable item for establishing reputational trustworthiness. Decoy, disguise, camouflage and concealment are all ways that appearance can be manipulated. The possibilities for exploitation of these primary trust cues seem practically limitless.

Additionally, there are certain other situational conditions that can make the bet of trust a little safer: accountability of the trustees, pre-commitment, and trust-inducing situations (Sztompka, 1999). Like the primary

grounds of trust, these too present the potential for manipulation. People may be willing to place their trust in someone or something when they perceive there is an agent of accountability that will help ensure that trust is met, whether a formal agent such as a court, agency, contract or treaty; or informal agents such as family, coworkers or teammates (Sztompka, 1999). Fraudulent websites or organizations may use a trusted logo or agency's name to gain credibility with a consumer. The fraudulent use of the Better Business Bureau (BBB) logo has been identified in one scam targeting online buyers ("BBB Issues International Alert," 2006). Creating the perception that an agency of accountability exists or creating a fake agency of accountability may also provide opportunity for exploitation through deception.

Manipulating pre-commitment by appearing to forfeit some degree of freedom also presents opportunity. An escrow agreement is one type of pre-commitment that is frequently made. The Better Business Bureau recently alerted consumers about a scam to defraud car buyers out of thousands of dollars. This particular scam involved the use of a fake escrow service to "protect" a customer and seller's interests when buying a high priced item online. The customer wires the money but the car never arrives. "The purpose of an escrow service is to create a safe environment where both the buyer and seller feel comfortable exchanging money and goods knowing they can't be taken advantage of," said Steve Cox, BBB spokesperson. "Unfortunately, scammers have realized they can cash in on this type of transaction by creating a facade of trustworthiness as an escrow company" ("BBB Consumer Alert," 2008).

Finally, the situation or setting can be manipulated in order to try to gain someone's trust. Sztompka (1999) mentions certain locations or occasions that create "psychological inhibitions for potential violators" (p. 95) present opportunities for deception. There is also the possibility to convince the truster (deception target) that if his or her trust is breached, the trustee (deceiver) will suffer severe consequences as well. An example of exploitation of situational trust might be taking advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust in what he thinks are fellow prisoners, but are actually an informant and a DEA agent (United States v. Escobar, 1994). Pablo Escobar may not have confided his plans and Medellin associations in another situation.

Sztompka also mentions two grounds for trust that are innate to an individual or culture: trusting impulse and trust culture (1999). Trusting impulse is shaped by life experiences with regard to trust. If an individual had trust fulfilled or met consistently throughout his experience, he may be more apt to trust. Conversely, if his trust was consistently breached, it may lead to suspiciousness or inherent distrust (Sztompka, 1999, p. 98). Similarly, trust culture deals with the collective trust experiences of a group or society. Certain cultures are more trusting than others. While neither of these grounds for trust can be created, they do have something to do with whether an individual is susceptible to deception, or to having their trust exploited.

In addition to the exploitation of the various grounds that Sztompka describes, trust can also potentially be manipulated in other ways. Trusting someone, or rather, displaying trust toward him, may evoke trustworthy behavior, but it may also evoke reciprocal trust. Some research has shown that when people think they are trusted, they produce Oxytocin, which makes them feel positive toward the truster, and want to reward them by being trustworthy. In other words, when one trusts another, there is a good chance that they will reciprocate. In *The Neurobiology of Trust*, Paul Zak writes, "receiving a signal of trust appears to make people feel positive about strangers who have trusted them" (p. 91). One way in which someone could take advantage of this tendency is by confiding something in an individual (falsely) or sharing a juicy piece of fabricated intelligence to encourage him or her to reciprocate by trusting the deceiver with information.

2. Undermining Trust by Deception

Hardin writes that, "Distrust and even merely the lack of trust can be very useful and can be strategically manipulated" (Hardin, 2002, 103). Anthony Pagden notes:

> Although it may be the case that no central agency is capable of intentionally creating trust where none previously or independently existed, it clearly does lie within the power of most effectively constituted agencies to destroy it. (as cited in Hardin, 2002, 103)

Hardin (2002) cites several examples of attempts to destroy trust:

> For example, the structure of prisons and the behavior of prison guards often provoke distrust

> between prisoners...they can become virtual enemies rather than allies who might pose a common front against the guards of the system. (p. 103)

Another example that he uses is that of the Spanish destruction of Neapolitan society in the 1600s. “This is a remarkably subtle account of how to dissolve trust relations within a society while still preserving order in the society...”(Hardin, 2002, p. 102). Robert Nieves writes about Pablo Escobar’s paranoia, which caused him to trust no one but family and very close friends. Nieves writes,

> Escobar became a fugitive, hunted by the largest task force ever assembled in Latin America. Living constantly under the threat of arrest, he began to suspect treason among his loyal surrogates. He murdered several of his closest associates. (Godson & Wirtz, 2002, p. 165)

Escobar’s paranoia and distrust ultimately “closed the circle around him tighter and tighter until he was located and killed in an armed confrontation with police” (Godson & Wirtz, 2002, p. 165). Pablo Escobar was aware that his communications were being monitored, and his communications with his closest family and friends are what eventually resulted in his demise.

While these examples pertain to introducing distrust but not necessarily by deception, there are examples of how deception can be used to damage trust in organizations, through infiltration among other methods. Paranoia or suspicion alone can result in the destruction of an organization or network. The CIA assembled information on the Abu Nidal organization and repeatedly contacted his agents asking them to work for the United States. Instead

of being rewarded for their loyalty upon reporting the approaches, they instead lost the trust of Abu Nidal (Ledeen, 2003). In *A Spy for all Seasons*, CIA operations officer Duane "Dewey" Clarridge writes of how an ambitious deception provoked psychotic paranoia in terrorist Abu Nidal's mind, causing him to destroy his own organization. "On a single night in November of 1987, approximately 170 [of his own people] were tied up and blindfolded, machine-gunned, and pushed into a trench prepared for the occasion. Another 160 were killed in Libya shortly thereafter" (Weisman, 2007). It is possible that just the idea that an organization has been infiltrated or is being monitored can do serious damage.

One example that will be covered in the next chapter uses both the creation of trust for exploitation and the undermining of existing trust to destabilize an organization. The FBI established and exploited trust in messages and that were used to undermine the KKK organization in the 1960s. Undermining trust within organizations and networks has the potential of destroying them.

IV. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED CASE STUDIES

As defined earlier, trust is a bet about the future contingent action of others; it is a belief or expectation, but also an action. Additionally, deception is the act of convincing someone to believe something that is false; not just to cause them to believe, but to act. Trusting leaves one vulnerable to risk and exploitation, and a deception planner may have the potential to create and/or exploit these vulnerabilities.

Four case studies have been selected to examine the relationship between trust and deception; specifically how trust may have been exploited or undermined in each case. Each case study will focus on the deception target's expectations and the various grounds for trust that may have been exploited.

A. OPERATION JAQUE

1. The Deception

Operation Jaque (which means "check" as in "check-mate") was a Columbian Military operation that took place on July 2, 2008, resulting in the rescue of fifteen hostages that had been held by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and the arrest of two FARC members. The success of the operation is attributed to a ruse on the FARC planned by Columbian Military Intelligence.

Operation Jaque consisted of the deception plan and a contingency plan to attack the rebels in the event that the deception failed (Viecco & Camp, 2008). The deception plan

was to trick the FARC leaders into loading the hostages into a helicopter that appeared to be a FARC sympathetic NGO in order to transfer them to another location (Viecco & Camp, 2008). The deception plan was to convince the FARC's regional leader holding the hostages, Gerardo Aguilar (also known as "Cesar"), that he was communicating with the new FARC leader, that he should round up the hostages into a single group and that Cesar and another front leader would be transported by a FARC-friendly NGO to another location in Columbia where they would meet the new FARC commander, Alfonso Cano (Viecco & Camp, 2008). The idea was that the leader would use the hostages to restart the negotiation process with France and other nations (Luhnow, 2008a).

The deception of the FARC rebels is a textbook example of a recent, effective deception and demonstrates that creative and meticulous deception planning can still be accomplished today. As Daniel and Herbig (1982) write, "deception is a deliberate misrepresentation of reality to gain a competitive advantage" (p. 155), and in this case, resulted in the release of 15 hostages, the capture of two rebels and perhaps irreparable damage to the FARC organization. The deception story appears to have been credible; Cesar had no reason for disbelief. This section proposes that trust played a role in the outcome and discusses the various trust relationships evident in the deception.

2. Targets of Trust and Trust Relationships

This deception consisted of several smaller deceptions. Perhaps the most crucial to the success of the operation was the Columbian military infiltration of the FARC

communication network. An elaborate “broken telephone” scheme convinced the regional leader Cesar that he was communicating with top leaders in the FARC’s 7-man secretariat (Luhnow, 2008a). Top guerilla leaders also thought they were communicating with Cesar; both were actually talking to Colombian Army intelligence (Luhnow, 2008a). In terms of Sztompka’s trust framework, Cesar trusted his communication network, and was convinced that he was communicating with FARC leadership. This leads to two trust relationships: (1) Cesar trusted the communication network to convey information accurately (that he was communicating with the supreme leader, and the communications were not compromised) and (2) Cesar trusted the individual that he thought he was communicating with (Alfonso Cano) about the transfer of hostages that was to occur.

The next trust relationships that will be examined are those that played a part on the day of the rescue. Cesar had consolidated three groups of hostages at one location to meet the helicopter that would transfer them to a new location. He and a fellow rebel would also board the helicopter with them, supposedly to meet the new leader, Alfonso Cano. This ultimately resulted in Cesar’s capture and the hostages’ release. It is evident that Cesar trusted that he was facilitating the hostages’ transfer to another location, and that he was going to be transported to meet the new FARC commander. This can be expressed as: Cesar trusted the NGO to (1) transport the hostages to another location and (2) transport him and his fellow FARC rebel to meet the new leader. The story met with Cesar’s expectations, partly because it was crafted to be similar to

past experiences with hostage transfers, and also because of important situational details that supported the main story.

3. Discussion of Expectations

Sztompka mentions three types of expectations that trust is based upon: Instrumental, axiological and fiduciary (1999). It is difficult to make many assumptions about expectations, especially in an operation that recently occurred, all of the details of which are yet to be fully known. We can assume, however, that Cesar based his trust, and actions, on certain expectations, which were most likely instrumental and axiological.

Why did Cesar trust that he was communicating with the supreme leader of the secretariat, and that the hostage transfer was not a ruse? Viecco and Camp (2008) note that the employment of a targeted man-in-the-middle attack and familiar techniques from "spear fishing"—"controlling context, personalizing the false messages and communicating a sense of urgency"- made the deception effective (p. 75). Since early 2008, the FARC had been using human envoys, a less secure communication channel, as communication transports between the secretariat and regional leaders (Viecco & Camp, 2008). Delivered voice recordings were used to maintain integrity. The Colombian military had already infiltrated the human envoys and was able to use information gleaned from confiscated FARC laptops to create plausible messages using a professional voice actor to imitate the new FARC supreme leader's voice (Viecco & Camp, 2008). Additionally, the Colombian military prevented Cesar from communicating with his direct superior, Mono Jojoy, in order to prevent his validation of the orders from a third party—

essentially a Denial of Service attack (Viecco & Camp, 2008). Other cues to manipulate the context were used to make the communication seem more trustworthy and will be discussed later. The messages that Cesar received were likely consistent with previous messages and appeared reasonable, probably giving him no reason to doubt the truthfulness and authenticity.

Cesar's trust in the communications that he thought were from the new FARC leader may have been based on instrumental expectations of the leadership. People generally have certain expectations of their leaders, such as regularity, reasonableness, credibility and/or efficiency. Cesar would have been unlikely to trust orders from the leadership if they were irrational or chaotic. As Sztompka mentions, expectations of regularity are relatively safe, since most people will generally act regularly (1999). The trust placed in the NGO to transport the rebels and the hostages to meet Alfonso Cano was most likely based on instrumental expectations as well, and possibly axiological expectations such as moral responsibility, honorable conduct, truthfulness, and authenticity. The use of what appeared to be a FARC-friendly NGO and FARC rebels met his expectations and did not raise his suspicions and distrust of the deception story.

4. Grounds for Trust

Sztompka (1999) writes,

> The persons or social objects (institutions, organizations, regimes) on which we consider conferring trust usually have been around for some time...We might already have been engaged with them earlier and therefore possess direct

> experience of their meeting or breaching our trust... or we may have second-hand information about them, based on stories, testimonies, evaluations or credentials given by others. (p. 71)

A cue to trust can be based on past conduct of a similar nature or past cases of meeting trust, basically a record of consistent trustworthy behavior. This was not the first hostage transfer that had occurred, so there were observations or memories of past behavior. This may explain why using similar helicopters, clothing and procedures were so important. The messages that Cesar received from what he perceived as the FARC's new supreme leader in the highest ruling body, also used reputation as a cue to establish trust. Additionally, a fictitious NGO, International Humanitarian Mission, was created by the Columbian military to accomplish the rescue mission. They used information from a real NGO for the website, which added credibility.

Presenting an appearance of being a rebel-friendly relief agency that would transport the hostages to another location was critical to the success of the operation. Personality, identity and status were conveyed in such a manner that Cesar trusted the NGO enough to not only hand over the hostages, but to board the helicopter himself. Sztompka notes that several appearance factors "exude trustworthiness" and others look suspicious (1999). The appearance of the actors in this deception was meticulously planned, down to the Che Guevara T-shirts that the "rebels" wore to make the organization and story more plausible.

The ploy utilized Russian-made helicopters, which were painted with white and red markings, similar to helicopters

used in other similar operations in the past, specifically a hostage release by Venezuela in January (Luhnow, 2008a). Additionally, the deception used a team of Columbian Military commandoes who played the roles of rebels, leftist NGO sympathizers and news crew. One of the external characteristics that Sztompka mentions as providing a central cue to trust, indicating underlying personality, identity and status, is dress (1999). Two of the undercover soldiers were dressed as television news crew; wearing red shirts and black vests usually worn by reporters from Chavez's Telesur network, who have been along on previous hostage releases (Luhnow, 2008a). Two of the undercover officers had the appearance of being FARC rebels. One undercover officer appeared to be an Australian leftist. Additionally, when the helicopter landed, "undercover military agents dressed in Che Guevara T-shirts and appearing to be leftist sympathizers of the rebels, descended from the helicopter and warmly greeted the rebels holding the hostages" (Luhnow, 2008a).

Former FARC guerillas working for the Columbian military coached the soldiers playing guerrillas on how to walk and talk, so they would be credible rebels (Luhnow, 2008a). Dialog similar to that from previous hostage transfers was used. An unkempt appearance was also key, which was cultivated by the undercover officers (Luhnow, 2008a). Sztompka (1999) mentions another important cue to trust is "body discipline, control of the body... cleanliness, and neatness" (p. 79). This is because people generally trust those who show such a control, but in this case, Cesar would be more likely to trust people similar to him. Sztompka (1999) writes:

> Which features of appearance and demeanor are taken as signals of trustworthiness, and which evoke suspicion, is always relative to the trustor, as well as the context in which the evaluation takes place...(p. 80)

People tend to trust those similar to themselves, as the inability to predict the future conduct of those who are different results in uncertainty and suspicion (Sztompka, 1999). The unkempt appearance therefore increased trustworthiness.

The hostages were also handcuffed and told they were being taken to a very important person in the FARC, and were “treated brusquely” (Luhnow, 2008b). Besides the safety concerns, this was to give the appearance that this was indeed a hostage transfer and not a rescue attempt.

Sztompka (1999) writes, “the trustworthiness of various objects of trust may be due not only to their immanent qualities...but also to some features of the external context in which their actions take place” (pp. 86-87). Two of these factors, accountability and situational facilitation of trust may have contributed to the success of this deception.

An NGO commonly refers to a “legally constituted organization created by natural or legal persons with no participation or representation of any government” (“Non-governmental organization,” 2009). An NGO’s neutrality allows it to interact with groups that would be difficult to interact with using other methods. NGOs are frequently trusted more than government organizations or companies, because of their neutrality. In order to maintain its reputation and neutrality, however, an NGO should not

violate trust, and faces the threat of formal and/or informal sanctions should a breach of trust occur. This enforcement of trustworthiness is accountability (Sztompka, 1999). The use of a fake NGO in this deception may have encouraged the regional leader to trust, but it is also likely that this ruse was successful because the rebels believed the NGOs were sympathetic to their cause, or because it was a similar scenario to the handover of hostages to Chavez in 2007. There is not adequate evidence to say that accountability played a role in enhancing trustworthiness. However, using fake NGOs in deceptions may lead to a loss of trustworthiness in NGOs, and may hinder future opportunities for operations such as this.

The character of the situation, or context, also plays a part in whether a deception target trusts or becomes suspicious. This hostage transfer was to take place amongst recent pushes for humanitarian exchanges. The FARC has pushed for these exchanges due to its decreasing military success, but several presidents such as Chavez and Sarkozy have been involved in these negotiations due to the political benefits (Viecco & Camp, 2008). Additionally the communications were made to appear more trustworthy by the leaking of fake news from the Colombian government about a meeting with some European countries to discuss a possible ‘humanitarian exchange’ (Viecco & Camp, 2008).

> A few days before the operation, two delegates from the European Union came to ask the Colombian government for permission to speak to the FARC precisely to start negotiating more hostage releases. The Colombian government gave them permission and then leaked word to the press,

> which helped reinforce the impression to the rebels holding the hostages that the story about Mr. Cano was right. (Luhnow, 2008a)

Two other grounds for trust, trusting impulse and trust culture, can also play a role in the granting of trust (Sztompka, 1999). In this case study, there is not enough information to make judgments about the trusting impulse of the deception target. It is similarly difficult to make judgments about trust culture. These two grounds for trust should be taken into account when planning a deception. If a deception target has consistently had trust breached, it could result in the incapacity to trust. Sztompka (1999) writes, "the trusting impulse becomes replaced with inherent suspiciousness, obsessive distrust, and alternative pathological developments in the social realm of juvenile gangs, organized crime, the Mafia, and so forth" (p. 99). Similarly, a culture's experiences with trust or distrust may play a large role in whether trust or suspicion is prevalent in the society (Sztompka, 1999). Both of these factors will influence the ability to create and exploit trust, and the susceptibility to deception.

5. Implications of Exploited Trust

The deception story in this case study not only met the FARC regional leader, Cesar's expectations, it also provided him with various clues of trustworthiness to base his trust on. Appearance, reputation, qualities of the situation itself, and possibly accountability, made the bet of trust less risky. Because of the credibility and plausibility of the story, the deception was a success. The

success of this operation may have future implications for the FARC organization, as well as for other deceptions of this type.

Already, the FARC had been weakened by the death of several top leaders and the defection of thousands of rebels (Luhnow, 2008a). The capture of laptops from a FARC camp in Ecuador earlier in the year, the infiltration of Columbian Military into the organization as well as the isolation of their fronts contributed to this operation. This deception may further exacerbate the fragmentation and may cause distrust and questioning of orders from FARC leaders.

A high-ranking officer in the Colombian Army said the successful rescue operation could be a "tipping point" for the FARC, which recently has lost three top leaders and hundreds of rebels who have defected and are providing the Colombian military valuable information about the group's inner workings (Luhnow, 2008a). "It's a brutal psychological hit," says the officer, who also believes the hostage rescue “will lead to mutual recrimination among the rebels and sharpen rivalries between top FARC commanders, leading to further desertions” (Luhnow, 2008a).

B. OPERATION MINCEMEAT, 1943

1. The Deception

Operation Mincemeat refers to a successful British World War II deception, part of a larger plan named Barclay, to convince the German high command that the Allies planned to invade the Balkans rather than Sicily following the North African Campaign of 1943 (Latimer, 2001, p. 94). Operation

Mincemeat is known by many as one of the most successful deception operations of World War II. Despite the meticulous planning and focus on details, the success of Operation Mincemeat ultimately depended on the deception story confirming the target's expectations and predispositions.

As he approved Operation Mincemeat, Winston Churchill remarked, "Everyone but a bloody fool would know it was Sicily" (Montagu, 2001, p. 7), referring to the obvious target. However, even two weeks after the landing in Sicily occurred, Hitler still remained convinced that the main assault would be in Greece (Montagu, 2001). This successful deception was due to an elaborate ruse to convince the Germans that they had intercepted "top secret" documents giving details of Allied war plans. The documents were attached to a corpse deliberately left to wash up on a beach in Spain. Also contributing to the deception was the inflation of British numbers, both Army and shipping, due to the exaggeration of reports by double agents that had been going on for years (Montagu, 2001, p. 7). The deception story of capturing Sardinia first and then Sicily from the North, and even a possible simultaneous Balkan invasion, was therefore plausible.

The plan involved persuading the Germans that they had intercepted a top-level personal letter that alluded to Allied war plans (Montagu, 1977, p. 144). This letter would be attached to a dead body dressed as an officer, which would wash ashore in Spain. The objective of this deception was to support Operation Barclay, which had four main objectives: to weaken Germany's defense of Sicily, pin down German troops in France and the Balkans, reduce enemy

attacks on Allied ships as they prepared for the assault on Sicily, and “secure the greatest surprise” for the assault (Montagu, 2001, pp. 7-8).

The next section will focus on the expectations, cues and/or predilections that may have played a role in the success of this operation.

2. Targets of Trust

Examining this deception from a trust perspective seems a little more difficult, since the targets of the Germans’ trust may not be as obvious. There are several candidates: Allied forces, the corpse that washed up on shore, the General who allegedly penned the letter, German intelligence agents and communication channels. This paper proposes that the primary object of trust was the Allied Forces. The Germans could either trust that the Allied forces would attack Sicily after the Campaign in North Africa or they could trust that the Allied Forces would attack somewhere else. Either way, they would have made a bet that incurred some risk. They bet and trusted that the Allied Forces would attack elsewhere, basically trusting the story that they were presented with. All of the elements of the Mincemeat deception plan aimed to create trust in the deception story.

There were several cues that led to the German’s bet of trust. Hitler would not have simply believed the Allied Forces had they told him Sicily was not the objective. This had to be deduced by German Intelligence and confirm what he already knew or expected for it to be credible. In order for Hitler to trust that the Allies had their sights on Sardinia or Greece rather than Sicily, second-hand cues would be

essential. Sztompka (1999) mentions another category of objects, "...there is also an important category of objects to be called the secondary objects of trust, which become the targets only derivatively, in the process of placing and justifying trust toward primary objects" (p. 46). Second-hand cues may include testimonies of experts, witnesses, sources, or authorities "referring to the credibility, or trustworthiness of the objects on which we consider placing our primary trust" (Sztompka, 1999, p. 46). Some of the secondary targets of trust of the Germans included their agents, intelligence channels, and the coroner who examined the corpse.

The Germans could not trust the Allies or the information planted on the washed up body without secondary cues. Additionally, this trust was based on expectations, which will be addressed in the next section.

3. Expectations and Grounds for Trust

As mentioned earlier, in order for a deception to be successful, it must reinforce enemy expectations. Trust based on the expectation that the Allied forces will act with regularity (for example: consistency, orderliness or continuity) is reasonable. A degree of efficiency and competence can also be expected. Instrumental expectations are basically expectations of rational behavior, and in a misleading deception it would be difficult to encourage the adversary to trust in an irrational target. This deception story reinforced enemy expectations because it made sense that Churchill would want to attack the Balkans. The plan was consistent with Churchill's references to the "soft underbelly of Europe" and Sardinia was a plausible target,

since it avoided fortified Sicily and left several options available (Montagu, 2001). The story also reinforced Hitler's fears of an attack in the Balkans. The inclusion of details about Sicily being a cover target was also reasonable and consistent (Montagu, 1977). The information conveyed in the Allied letters was consistent with what the Germans might expect the letters to contain. The deception planners gave just enough information for the Germans to come to the conclusion that the Allies would land in Sardinia and use Sicily as a cover.

As discussed previously, Sztompka examines three foundations of trust—relational, psychological, and cultural—that determine the bets of trust that people make (1999). The Allied deception planners aimed to make the Germans trust the deception story, and therefore needed to establish its trustworthiness. Operation Mincemeat required that the document containing the information be so convincing that the Germans would act upon it by directing their efforts away from Sicily. Authenticity was of paramount importance (Montagu, 2001). The success of Mincemeat relied on the creation of a persona—the appearance and reputation of which had to corroborate the deception story and the German decision maker's expectations.

The approved plan was that a corpse would be set adrift from a submarine off the coat of Huelva, Spain. The body would have a briefcase containing important papers attached to it. Huelva was chosen because it was relatively certain that the papers or important documents would be turned over to a "Very active German agent...who had excellent contacts with certain Spaniards" (Montagu, 2001, p. 32). The papers

contained in the briefcase were to convince the Germans that the Allies would attack Sardinia and Greece—not Sicily. The plan required that the Germans trust the information contained in the letter, and that required that they be able to verify the 'authenticity' of the man's persona as well as believing that he would be carrying such a high-level letter (Montagu, 1977). A great effort was made to find a body that would have the appearance of being a victim of an aircraft crash at sea. The planners sought the confidential advice of a pathologist who advised them on the type of body that would appear consistent with the story. A body that was found in a "Mae West" life preserver could have died from any of a number of causes—including drowning, exposure, or shock (Montagu, 2001). A body was found that had a suitable appearance and would pass for someone who died while floating at sea (Montagu, 2001).

Major William Martin was chosen as the identity of the man who would wash ashore. The name was chosen because there were several officers with that name who were of similar seniority for his age on the current Navy lists (Montagu, 1977, p. 148). The man was in his early 30s, and it was decided that he should be a staff officer in the Royal Marines. This would explain his less than excellent physical condition, as well as make it easier to find him a uniform (Montagu, 2001). Major Martin was Catholic, as indicated on his dog tag, by a cross on his neck, and a St. Christopher plaque in his wallet—this would also help ensure that the Spaniards not perform an autopsy ("Operation Mincemeat," 2005). To give the appearance of authenticity, he had a briefcase chained to his wrist, which contained confidential papers, a wallet, an overdraft from his bank,

ticket stub from a play, a bill for a recent purchase of an engagement ring, personal letters, and a photo of his fiancée (Craig, 2005, p. 104). The planners went to great lengths to make Major Martin seem human, and included character flaws such as a replacement ID card and replacement HQ pass, letters from his father and an overdraft, all to reinforce the image that even though he was a responsible officer, he was a bit careless in his own affairs ("Operation Mincemeat," 2005). All of these details were to appear consistent with expectations of what a young Royal Marine would be like and what he would be carrying with him.

The reputation of the originator of the letter had to be established in order for the story to be credible. Montagu (2001) writes,

> ...If the purpose of this document was to deceive the Germans so that they would act upon it, then it had to be on a really high level; no indiscretion or "leak" from an officer of normal rank would do. Even a security lapse from one brigadier, air commodore or rear admiral to another would be weighty enough. (p. 43)

The Germans had to be convinced that the officers concerned would know with certainty Allied plans, and were not themselves victims of a cover plan (Montagu, 2001). Montagu writes, "If the operation was to be worthwhile, I had to have a document written by someone, and to someone, whom the Germans knew—and whom they knew to be "right in the know" (Montagu, 2001, p. 43). Establishing reputation was essential. It was decided that the letter should be from General Sir Archibald Nye, the Vice-Chief of Imperial General Staff, to General Alexander at 18th Army Group

Headquarters. Additionally, Major Martin had to have a certain reputation that would justify him carrying a letter of such importance. Montagu took care of that with a letter. The letter was from Lord Louis Mountbatten to Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, and made clear that he was a trustworthy officer who was selected to carry the important letter for General Alexander (Montagu, 2001). It emphasized that it was an urgent and sensitive matter, and that Major Martin was a competent, intelligent officer (Montagu, 2001).

Aside from the details of Major Martin's identity and the letters that he carried, there were other details about the situation that served as additional indicators or cues of trustworthiness. These details included the location in which the body was planned to wash ashore. The planners had chosen Huelva, Spain, because they knew that Spain was thoroughly penetrated by the Germans, and that any papers that were found on the body would end up in the hands of the Germans (Montagu, 2001, p. 33).

There is a significant amount written about Hitler's childhood and youth, which helps to explain his trusting impulse, or lack thereof. Redlich (1998) notes that Hitler felt that his father did not love him and his mother did not love him enough, despite his love for his mother. Redlich writes,

> According to Erikson, security and faith in later life are based on a trustful relationship with the parents, and particularly with the mother. In my opinion Hitler did not trust his mother nor any women, and always remained a mistrustful person. (p. 257)

The problems between Hitler and his brother and their father increased in Hitler's adolescence. He did poorly in school and suffered from a lack of confidence and depression in his early adulthood. However, he eventually transformed himself into a charismatic politician (Redlich, 1998). In his book *Hitler: Diagnosis of a Destructive Prophet*, Redlich describes Hitler as a "destructive and paranoid prophet" who suffered from political paranoia (Redlich, 1998, p. 335).

Trust culture also plays a part in determining how trusting or suspicious individuals are (Sztompka, 1999). The years leading up to World War II were difficult times in Germany, having been humiliated in defeat during the First World War and believing they had been betrayed. Disillusionment and distrust contributed to the rise of Nazism and Nihilism ("World War I," 2009). There was little trust in government. Hitler eventually gained full power, establishing a totalitarian state and restructuring industry. A rise in tensions in 1939 from growing nationalism, militarism and territorial issues led to World War II ("Germany," 2009). Germany's experience in World War I affected its attitudes and actions during World War II. Steinert (1977) notes,

> During the course of the war, comparisons were made again and again, both by political leaders and the public, to the time of the First World War...the Nazi elites tried its utmost to prevent a repeat of the so-called stab-in-the-back...the legend...that the homeland had undermined the front. (p. 2)

To what extent these factors affected Hitler's decision to trust the deception story is unclear. It seems that this would make him suspicious in general, but the deception story and clues confirmed his expectations, which was most likely more important to the success of the operation.

4. Trust Exploited

On D-Day, July 10, 1943, Allied troops met with little resistance when landing at Sicily. Operation Mincemeat was such a success that even two weeks after Operation Husky's D-Day, Hitler still believed that the main assault would be in Greece (Montagu, 2001). It was clear that the Germans had switched their focus and efforts from the south of Sicily to the western and northern portions that would have been threatened if the Allied Forces were either conducting a diversionary or secondary attack on Sicily (Montagu, 2001, p. 126). It seemed that the German's had trusted the message and deception story.

Later, evidence of the German Intelligence Service's reaction to the documents was received. A "most secret" document by German Intelligence that was attached to the copy of the Sir Archibald Nye letter indicated that Admiral Doenitz had read it (Montagu, 2001, p. 129). The document indicated that they believed the documents were "above suspicion," that they believed the deception story, and also revealed the fact that the Germans carefully studied "every word and implication" of the letter (Montagu, 2001, p. 132).

Montagu (2001) writes, "it fully justified the care with which we had built up the personality of Major Martin,

so that the very “reality” of that officer carried conviction as to the genuineness of the documents that he was carrying...”(p. 134).

5. Implications of Deception

This deception shows that it is possible to cause an adversary to place trust in a deception story if the target’s expectations are considered and trustworthy cues are provided. The planting of information via false documents was nothing new—other deceptions had utilized this method in the past. The successful “Haversack” ruse in World War I is one example. Germany had also found documents on a body that had floated ashore from a plane crash in 1942 and discounted them as bogus, even though the information about the upcoming Operation Torch was in fact true and not a deception (“Operation Mincemeat,” 2009). The fact that they had discounted important documents before may have made them more likely to trust the Mincemeat documents. There are surely limits to how many times a ruse can be used successfully, however.

One possible result of deception is that the deceived may have a greater alertness to being deceived again, and will be less trusting of received information. This does not necessarily mean that there is less of a chance of being deceived. As a result of the British success of Operation Mincemeat, the Germans became excessively alert to the possibility of being deceived (Handel, 1982, p. 144). Handel writes:

> When the detailed plans of the impending landing in Normandy fell into their hands...they were convinced that this was yet another clever Allied deception; consequently, they refused to accept the detailed plan as authentic. (p. 144)

C. BARBAROSSA, 1941

1. The Deception

Operation Barbarossa was the code name for Germany's campaign to mislead Stalin and achieve surprise upon the invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II. The operation commenced on June 22, 1941, when 4.5 million Axis troops invaded Russia on an 1800-mile front ("Operation Barbarossa," 2009). It is notable that despite a large amount of accurate Soviet intelligence regarding troop movements and fortifications that should have made Hitler's intent obvious, and intelligence from other Allied sources, Stalin refused to take decisive actions to prepare for the German invasion.

Germany was able to accomplish this "M-type" deception by disguising its build-up on the Russian border as an exercise linked to the invasion of Britain (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 158). An important reason that the German deceivers were able to achieve surprise was that Barbarossa took advantage of Stalin's expectations and preconceived notions, specifically Stalin's expectation that Germany would not attack under the current circumstances. Two circumstances, not planned deceptions, contributed to Barbarossa: the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and the War with Britain and related events in the West (Stolfi, 1982, p. 196).

This case study will examine why Stalin trusted the Germans and their deception story when intelligence and evidence existed showing the German buildup and intentions in the East.

2. Stalin's Expectations

The German deception campaign that lasted from July 31, 1940, until June 22, 1941, consisted of four mutually supporting themes that were well planned to fit the Russians preconceptions and "achieved almost complete believability within the intelligence services of Russia" (Whaley, 2002, p. 81).

Stalin's expectations and preconceptions of Germany's behavior led to their misplacement of trust and ultimate deception. These included instrumental and possibly axiological expectations that facilitated the bet that Germany would not attack yet. His expectations were so strong that Germany did not have to do much in terms of deception—Stalin practically deceived himself.

Sztompka (1999) notes that expectations of regularity (orderliness, consistency, coherence, continuity, and persistence) are "rather safe, because the probability that most agents will behave regularly, rather than randomly and chaotically, is relatively high" (p. 53). Conclusions have been made that Stalin expected that the Germans would not attack in 1941, and that "any German build-up would be part of a familiar pattern of demands and provocation that the Soviets would recognize and could parry at least until 1941" (Stolfi, 1982, p. 201). This suggests that Stalin had certain instrumental expectations of Hitler, that his

behavior would be consistent with past behavior. This was due to the 1939 Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact, which the Soviets firmly adhered (Stolfi, 1982, p. 201). There had been a few events that stressed the Pact, but Germany had given credible explanations for the Polish Campaign, occupation of Bulgaria and war in the Balkans (Stolfi, 1982, p. 201). Germany and Russia held high-level meetings and subsequently negotiated two trade agreements in November 1940 in an "outwardly effective show of cooperation and friendship" (Stolfi, 1982, p. 201). Stolfi (1982) also mentions, "such harmony would contribute to the genuine surprise widely expressed by the civilian populations of both Germany and Russia over the attack" (p. 202).

It seemed that the bet of trust that the Soviets would not attack in 1941 was also based on the expectation that Germany would have their hands quite full in the west. Stalin's biographer General Volkogonov wrote,

> Britain's continued resistance made it possible for Stalin to hew to the consistent line that Hitler would never turn against Russia until he had vanquished the British and that Hitler would never repeat the error of the first World War and entrap Germany in a two-front war. (as cited in Barros and Gregor, 1995, p. 9)

Andrei Zhdanov, a member of the Politburo of the Party's central committee also noted that with Germany involved with Britain, the Russians were able to do what they wanted (Barros & Gregor, 1995). Kuznetsov (1969) notes that Zhdanov thought that World War I was evidence of Germany's inability to fight on two fronts and "recalled

Bismarck's famous comment that Germany should never sever its contacts with Russia" (as cited in Barros & Gregor, 1995, p. 9).

3. Grounds for Trust

Reputation and performance are both grounds for granting trust, as they give some indication of the degree of trustworthiness of the trustee (Sztompka, 1999). Indicators of reputation and performance likely contributed to increasing Stalin's trust in Hitler and his suspicion of Britain and France. Sztompka notes, "The knowledge relevant for our decision to trust depends on the type of trust being considered" (p. 71). It may refer to past conduct of a similar nature, past cases of meeting trust or past occasions of returning trust (Sztompka, 1999). Past and current experience with Germany and the Allies affected Russia's trust decisions. In this case, Hitler's conduct with regard to maintenance of economic and diplomatic ties was an important factor in assuaging Russian suspicions (Whaley, 2002, p. 84). Some of the efforts included the continued commercial negotiations and deliveries of strategic goods, weapons and military-industrial manufactures and negotiations of frontiers that began with the Russo-German Pact of 1939 (Whaley, 2002). Murphy (2005) writes that "Hitler appears to have personally reassured Stalin that Great Britain, not the Soviet Union, was Germany's principal enemy" (p. 248) and that the troops on the Eastern front were there to protect them from Britain and prepare for an invasion of Britain. The letters include Hitler's assurance; "on (his) honor as chief of state" that Germany would not invade (Murphy, 2005, p. 258). Germany's

reputation based on recent conduct with the Soviet Union and its current performance likely contributed to Stalin's decision to trust. Stalin was convinced that the Capitalist states of Britain and France would never help the Communist Soviet Union to maintain peace, but rather would "connive to ensure Hitler would turn eastward...even going so far as to join Hitler in an attack on the USSR" (Murphy, 2005, p. xvii). The 1938 Sudeten Crisis, the inability to come to an agreement with Britain and France, and the lack of support for a two-pronged attack on Germany added to the distrust of the Allied forces. Stalin chose to trust Hitler rather than Churchill and Roosevelt when they tried to warn him. The warnings only served to confirm his beliefs of a conspiracy (Murphy, 2005). The reputations and performance of both Germany and the Allied Forces must be considered.

Agents of accountability serve as enforcers of trustworthiness, because they monitor or sanction the trustee (Sztompka, 1999); they add an incentive for the trustee to live up to the expectations of the trustor. Hardin (1991) notes, "you can more confidently trust me if you know that my own interest will induce me to live up to your expectations" (as cited in Sztompka, 1999, p. 88). Additionally, pre-commitment is a special type of accountability that can strengthen the estimation of trustworthiness. Pre-commitment involves a trustee who sacrifices certain freedoms or actions to increase their trustworthiness (Sztompka, 1999). Stalin signed a 10-year agreement with Germany on August 24, 1939, shortly after tripartite discussions between Russia, Britain and France broke down. Stated provisions of the pact included agreement not to attack the other, neutrality in the event of an

attack by another power, consultation, arbitration of differences between parties, and no membership of a group of powers aimed against the other (“German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact,” 2009). The pact also included “secret protocols” that were later revealed. There are several theories about the reasons that Stalin entered into the pact, one of which was that Stalin entered into the pact because Russia was not prepared to fight a war in 1939 and needed “immunity from German attack” (Carr, 1952 as cited in “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,” 2009). It was also beneficial to Hitler, as he could focus on the West without the threat of war with Russia. Such a pact can be considered a type of pre-commitment, since both parties limit their freedom of action and are bound to certain terms of the agreement. This type of arrangement makes the partners more trustworthy, and decreases the risks of trusting. Without someone to hold parties accountable, however, a pact may be worthless.

Perhaps the biggest situational facilitation of trust that is evidenced is the war in the West. Stolfi (1982) writes, “working within the favorable deceptive circumstances of friendly relations with the Soviet Union and a noisily active war with another major power...the Germans executed effective active and passive deception...”(p. 217). The plan for the invasion of Britain in 1941, Operation Sea Lion, while initially a plan to invade Britain became a grand deception for the attack of the Soviet Union (Stolfi, 1982, p. 197). In addition to the war in the west, the buildup and major offensives against the Balkans and Operation Mercury against Crete in 1941 also

provided a cover story for Barbarossa, as it reduced the probability of a German attack against Russia in the summer of 1941 (Stolfi, 1982, p. 198; Whaley, 2002, p. 83).

In addition to clues of trustworthiness relating to reputation, performance, agents of accountability and situational factors, clues relating to trust culture and the trusting impulse may also be useful in this analysis. The period of time leading up to the Second World War was a difficult time in the Soviet Union. Stalin gained control of the Communist Party and received much criticism for his industrial policies and the widespread famine attributed to his agricultural policies (Murphy, 2005). As a result, he eliminated opposition through a series of purges, arresting and executing some of the most talented and experienced Soviets (Murphy, 2005). This caused a widespread atmosphere of fear and suspicion. The problems in Russia were occurring during a time when Germany was rearming and beginning to take actions to expand its territory, to include taking Czechoslovakia. Murphy (2005) writes,

> Stalin...must certainly have known, after his rebuff in Czechoslovakia at the hands of the British and French, that he could expect little help from them were he to oppose a German invasion of Poland. Consequently, he would drive the best bargain he could with Hitler. (p. 6)

These events led to the 1939 Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact, and might explain why Stalin came to trust Hitler more than he would the Allies.

4. Stalin’s Suspicions

Michael Handel (1982) notes that Stalin may have deceived himself by believing deception was behind many acts when, in fact, it was not (p. 139). Handel writes:

> The Soviet’s communist ideology assumes that the capitalists will always try to deceive and that therefore they should never be trusted in the first place...Thus when Churchill and the British warned him on the basis of knowledge acquired by Ultra of impending German attack in 1941, he refused to believe them and viewed this information as an attempt to drag the Soviet Union into a war against Germany in order to ease the pressure in the West. (p. 139)

D. FBI INFILTRATION OF THE KKK

1. The Deception

COINTELPRO, or Counter Intelligence Program, was the name given to a program of covert operations conducted by the FBI in the 1950s and 1960s, focusing on violent or subversive organizations in the United States (“Facts and Figures,” 2003). FBI records show that approximately 15% of COINTELPRO resources were expended to marginalize and subvert "White Hate Groups" including the Ku Klux Klan and National States' Rights Party (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007).

The disappearance of three civil rights workers in Mississippi in the summer of 1964, an example of the spread of Klan terror in the South, prompted the initiation of a large-scale investigation of the Klan activities (Davis, 1992). KKK violence in the South escalated during July, August and September. The KKK had grown to 14,000 members (Davis, 1992). During the same time period, the bodies of

the three civil rights workers were found. The directives governing COINTELPRO were issued by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover in August 1964, who ordered FBI agents to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the Ku Klux Klan and other hate groups (Davis, 1992). In essence, war against the Klan was declared.

The arsenal of techniques that the FBI used in this counter-intelligence program were similar to those used against other movements, such as the Communist Party U.S.A and the Socialist Workers Party, but this was the first time that they were used against "homegrown" targets—meaning there was no link between the White Hate targets and foreign or international groups (Davis, 1992). This program ran for seven years and is credited with the dramatic decline of the KKK, which by the end of the program in 1971 was down to 4,300 members (Davis, 1992). There were over 289 counterintelligence actions directed against primarily KKK targets, with known results from 139 (Davis, 1992). Many of these actions aimed to draw members away from the organization, sow seeds of distrust and suspicion amongst the members, and to disrupt Klan activities. The COINTELPRO did this in a variety of ways, some of which will be examined in more detail: (1) propaganda campaigns; (2) false organizations established to draw people away from the Klan; and (3) infiltrations and the use of informants (Davis, 1992).

The FBI was able to establish and exploit trust in the deception and propaganda campaign that it conducted.

Through the use of informants, infiltration and by discrediting Klan members, they undermined trust in the organization, leading to its dramatic decline.

2. Targets of Trust

There are several trust relationships that can be seen in the FBI's operations against the Klan. There was a deception campaign in the form of propaganda and misinformation aimed at the families, associates and communities of Klan members as well as the Klan members themselves—the effectiveness of which relied on the credibility of the messages and sources used. This required that the recipients trust the source and the content of the messages. Even if the message was an anonymous letter, there had to be something about it that made the reader believe the content. Another technique that was used was the creation of fictitious organizations. In order for this deception tactic to accomplish the objective of drawing members away from the Klan, it had to cause the targeted members to trust the fictitious organization about their claims with regard to the KKK. For example, informants set up an entirely notional Klan that aimed to draw members away from the UKA; it eventually had a membership of 250 and was directed by the FBI (Davis, 1992). Creating trust in the sources of information and in the false organizations resulted in a decrease of trust in the KKK organization itself.

In addition to the targets of trust discussed above, another element of the FBI's campaign against the KKK was to undermine trust in the organization itself. This entailed breaking trust relationships. Members have certain

expectations of their fellow Klansmen that if violated can destroy trust. Klansmen trust other members, particularly the Klan leaders, to uphold certain values—similar to other fraternal or oath-bound organizations that the Klan was modeled after. Attacking or questioning the values of a member is one way to fracture that trust. Similarly, maintaining anonymity or secrecy is also valued, and members trust one another to maintain it. The perception of informants or infiltrators can cause paranoia or suspicion, undermining and ultimately destroying trust.

3. Trust Relative to Expectations

All the techniques that the FBI brought to bear on the KKK had one objective—to undermine and discredit the Klan. Many of the tactics focused on the expectations of the Klansmen, both of their fellow Klansmen and the leaders. These expectations include less risky instrumental expectations, such as regularity, reasonableness, and expectations of efficiency. Trust in the organization was also based on riskier axiological expectations of moral responsibility, honorable conduct towards other members, and shared religious and patriotic values. Klansmen expected secrecy, and a certain standard of behavior, which is common in oath driven organizations. In fact, the oath requires members to pledge values such as secrecy, honor, patriotism, benevolence, fraternity and faithfulness, while also committing to racism and nativism (“Between the Wars,” 1975). They also expected certain behavior from their leaders such as competence, proper performance, and responsible use of resources and dues. The oath implies that there are certain fiduciary expectations as well, such as

benevolence, disinterestedness, putting another's interests first, and generosity. The expectations that are most evident are instrumental and axiological. The COINTELPRO took advantage of these expectations in their campaign against the Klan.

The propaganda and disinformation campaigns relied on establishing credibility or trust in the messages that were sent. One of the most effective mailings used was a simple postcard (Davis, 1992). These postcards were sent anonymously to members' residences and places of employment (Davis, 1992). This campaign focused on members' expectation of secrecy or anonymity. This deception was effective and credible because it convinced the recipient that someone knew who he was. The FBI's mailing lists were compiled by membership lists from informants or information about rally attendees (Davis, 1992). Agents reduced suspicion and possible distrust of the messages by the use of different typewriters, writing styles, and only sending a few at a time from different locations (Davis, 1992). Many recipients trusted the message that they received, because if they received the cards it was evident someone knew who they were. Davis (1992) writes, "according to informants working within the local klaverns, a number of Klan members said they had received cards, and expressed concern that their privacy had been penetrated by someone they did not know" (p. 79). These mailings also served to create distrust between members, since they often led to the suspicion of other Klan members.

Another technique the FBI used to draw members away from the Klan was the use of fictitious or notional organizations. The bureau created a newsletter to be sent to klaverns where tensions existed, or where informants were likely to be recruited (Davis, 1992). This newsletter appealed to the values of patriotism and religion of Klan members, and encouraged them to leave the Klan and join the (fictitious) 'National Committee for Domestic Tranquility.' The newsletters had a strong impact on the Klan (Davis, 1992). Again, the mailings of the newsletters to Klan members made them realize that their membership was not secret and caused membership to decline. Some of these newsletters implicated corrupt leaders or communists in the organization and served to undermine the leadership (Vaughan & Drabble, 2006).

One FBI communication to Klan members accused Klan leaders of being 'confidence men' and swindling dues and donations to fund their lifestyles (Vaughan & Drabble, 2006). Klansmen trust in their leaders was based partly on certain expectations of moral conduct, or axiological expectations, such as being morally responsible, honest, and following some general moral rules—not embezzling money. The FBI disseminated information regarding derogatory or embarrassing information (such as embezzlement or sexual immorality) to trusted contacts in the media and local governments (Vaughan & Drabble, 2006). This exposed several Klan leaders such as United Klans of America Grand Dragon J. R. Jones and UKA Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton as "money makers," "leaders of a tight knit dictatorship that holds no elections and tolerates no criticism from the ranks" (Vaughan & Drabble, 2006). Mailings to Klansmen echoed

similar themes, stating ‘Klansman, which Klan leaders are spending your money tonight? Think!’ In addition to supplying information about these financial breaches of trust, other propaganda focused on sexual immorality, capitalizing on rumors circulating in the Klan of J. R. Jones extramarital affairs (Vaughan & Drabble, 2006). Propaganda also appealed to a shared anti-communist sentiment, likening leaders to ‘cowardly communists’ (Vaughan & Drabble, 2006). Vaughan and Drabble (2006) write,

> Depending on whether the recipient of this cartoon had previously trusted their leaders or not, the cartoons either evoked or reinforced a sense of moral superiority vis-à-vis the leadership, and concerns about the authenticity of their credentials were either undermined or confirmed.

Informants were used extensively in supplying information to the FBI for the purposes of the propaganda campaign. As a result, the information in the messages was much more credible and trustworthy. Davis (1992) writes: “Former Klan informants now recall that they reported in everything imaginable concerning the klaverns and the individual KKK members” (p. 87). The use of shared symbology, values, and language in cartoons and messages allowed FBI efforts to hit very close to home, creating trust in the messages and exploiting weaknesses in the organization.

4. Grounds for Trust

In order to decide whether to confer trust, traits of the trustee (reflected trustworthiness), and the context the

trustee operates in (derived trustworthiness) must be considered (Sztompka, 1999). As seen in the other cases studied, deceptions can manipulate these cues or traits to create trust. In the deception campaign that the FBI conducted against the KKK, these cues are seen to a certain extent, but the focus of this discussion will be on the methods that the FBI used to undermine these cues of trustworthiness amongst Klan members.

Primary trustworthiness of targets is based on reputation, performance, and appearance (Sztompka, 1999). The deceptions in this case manipulated cues such as reputation and appearance. Reputation as a ground for trust can be based on first-hand knowledge of an individual or organization, second-hand accounts or testimonies, or credentials based on trust granted by others (Sztompka, 1999). One clue to a person's reputation is personal interaction with that person over a period of time. Another is membership in a selective group. Testimonies or credentials granted by credible organizations or persons also suggest trustworthiness. Some of the deception techniques used interviews or informants to provide trusted, reliable news sources with information to discredit Klan leaders and members (Vaughan & Drabble, 2006). Using reputable sources to promulgate this disinformation aids in enhancing its trustworthiness. Several of the mailings used, including the NCDT newsletters and the letters to wives of Klansmen, appealed to people's desire to maintain their reputation; others attempted to destroy and discredit the reputation of Klan leaders (Davis, 1992; Vaughan & Drabble, 2006). Since people in an organization frequently use reputation as an indicator of one's trustworthiness,

manipulating reputation may be an effective way to create trust for exploitation or to destroy trust in an organization.

Appearance is another cue that is used to establish trustworthiness and was an important factor for a Klan member in determining whom to trust or distrust. Sztompka (1999) notes that people are more inclined to trust others who are similar to them and distrust those who are dissimilar. We are more likely to trust someone of a similar race, age or gender because their behavior is more predictable (Sztompka, 1999). This deception relied on infiltrators who had a similar, trustworthy appearance, and fictitious organizations such as the NCDT and the notional Klan that had the appearance of consisting of people just like them. Highlighting differences between people in an organization, in terms of who they are, what they possess, or their status, may cause rifts that can be exploited.

As mentioned earlier, there are three types of contextual conditions that are instrumental in establishing trustworthiness: accountability of the trustees, pre-commitment and trust-inducing situations (Sztompka, 1999). The KKK is an oath-driven organization, and as such has certain rules and sanctioning of Klan members' conduct. Members must go through an initiation ceremony where they take an oath. Klan members were held accountable to the leaders and also informally to their fellow Klansmen. The conduct of Klan leaders was also monitored by other members of the Klan. Accountability to others in an organization encourages trustworthiness, mainly by the threat of censure and punishment (Sztompka, 1999). Hence members of the Klan

who took a membership oath would seem trustworthy to other members. An infiltrator or an informant who appears to be under the same agreement or agent of accountability would also seem trustworthy.

Pre-commitment is sometimes present in initiation rituals of gangs and criminal organizations. Sztompka (1999) writes, “this raises their trustworthiness because first, it proves the seriousness of their aspirations to belong, and second...it changes their legal situation as guilty of crime” (p. 93). Klan members applied for membership, took an oath of membership during an initiation ceremony, and were required to pay initiation dues, building trustworthiness and strengthening their ties to the group. By performing these same acts, infiltrators were able to establish trustworthiness as well.

The features of the setting or context also contribute to the decision to grant or withdraw trust. Sztompka (1999) writes, “Trust is easier to come by in close-knit, small, intimate communities...” (p. 93) A fraternal organization, especially one where members are similar and have close bonds, relationships and goals, may encourage trustworthiness amongst members.

Finally, trust impulse and trust culture can serve as bases for trust. Hardin (1993) notes, “High capacity for trust is a by-product of fortunate experience” (as cited in Sztompka, 1999, p. 97). If trust is frequently met, a trusting impulse is facilitated; if trust is frequently violated or breached, the trusting impulse may be suppressed, resulting in incapacity to trust (Sztompka, 1999). The resulting distrust and suspicion can lead to the

involvement in gangs and criminal organization (Sztompka, 1999). It cannot be said, however, that association with a certain organization or movement means that a member had unfortunate experiences with trust and lacks a trusting impulse. The KKK consisted of different people from different life experiences, some committed to acts of violence, and others who were law abiding citizens. Many were characterized as being uneducated or economically disadvantaged; many were average, working class men; and others were wealthy. There is no evidence of a psychological trait or background common to members, and a generalization of trusting impulse cannot easily be made.

In *The Ku Klux Klan*, Sara Bullard writes, “the study of the ebb and flow of the Ku Klux Klan in the United States reveals a pattern: the Klan is strong when its leaders are able to capitalize in social tensions and the fears of white people...”(p. 24). The Klan of the 1960s reflects the tensions and fears that arose out of the repeal of “separate but equal” and order for integration (Bullard, 1998). Sztompka (1999) makes the conclusion that “cultural roles...may play a powerful role in codetermining the degree to which trust or distrust prevail in a given society, at a certain historical moment” (p. 101). In the 1960s, many people were suspicious of the government and institutions, and interracial distrust was also evident. These factors may have played a role in KKK members’ decisions of trust.

5. Trust Exploited

The FBI was able to establish and exploit trust in the deception and propaganda campaign that they conducted against the Ku Klux Klan in the 1960s. The Bureau was able

to take advantages of certain expectations and cues of trustworthiness to conduct a credible deception. Through the use of informants, infiltration, fictitious organizations, and propaganda discrediting Klan members, they also undermined trust in the organization leading to its dramatic decline. Although COINTELPRO was terminated in 1971 after operations were exposed and has been criticized for its methods and targets, there are lessons to be learned from the successful neutralization of an organization such as the KKK. Understanding expectations and trust in an organization is important in planning a deception operation such as this.

V. CONCLUSIONS

While much has been written on both trust and deception, less has been written about the connection between the two. Trust literature mentions that trust may leave one open to deception, that in the action of trusting, an individual incurs the risk of not having that trust met or of having that trust exploited. The impact of having trust consistently breached or exploited is also mentioned as Sztompka discusses individual and collective trust experiences that contribute to two grounds for trust: trusting impulse, and trust culture. Deception can also have serious consequences on future trust.

Most deception literature refers to the targets' beliefs, expectations and preconceived notions, and the necessity of the deception story to fit with them. The definition of trust used in this paper—an expectation or belief followed by an action, or as Sztompka defines it: "a bet about the future contingent actions of others"—is precisely what a deception planner wants the target of a deception to do. In order for a target to believe the deception story and take the desired action required that the story match the target's expectations. Most deception theorists mention this as a principle of deception.

If trust leaves an individual vulnerable to deception, why wouldn't a deception planner want to exploit that vulnerability? It seems that in the vast amount of literature written on the theme of trust, deception is regarded as a bad thing. In the literature on deception, however, it is recognized as a useful and powerful

capability. Deception is a part of human nature. It has been part of military strategy throughout history and has led to many successes and victories. It stands to reason that we should seek to be better deceivers in some sense, and looking to topics such as trust may help. Exploring the reasons or factors behind the act of trusting may aid in understanding vulnerability to deception. This may aid the deception planner in the development of a credible deception story that the deception target will trust. Understanding the trust relationships within an organization can also aid in the deliberate undermining of that trust.

Sztompka discusses expectations in terms of the risk of the bet made in each case. One incurs more risk when betting on someone's moral behavior, honesty or disinterestedness than when betting on their regularity, rationality or consistency. If a deception planner is trying to encourage a deception target to place a bet, and take an action based on trust, it makes sense that he or she would focus on instrumental expectations. That is not to say that there are not opportunities to take advantage of axiological or fiduciary expectations.

There are also certain clues that help people decide whether to trust and lessen the risk. Sztompka identifies several. Reflected trustworthiness, the most important ground for trust, involves using information to make an estimate of trustworthiness about the trustee. Sztompka writes, "Such knowledge may be true or false, right or wrong, correct or incorrect. The probability of well-placed trust rises with the amount and variety of true information about the trustee. Without such knowledge, trust is blind

and the chances of breach of trust are high" (Sztompka, 1999, p. 70). Certain characteristics of the external context or situation may also enhance trustworthiness, reducing the risk of the bet (Sztompka, 1999, p. 87). Finally, some people are inclined to trust or suspicion despite estimates of trustworthiness. This may be because of individual experiences with trust or distrust, or the collective experiences of a culture. If a potential truster relies on these clues to lessen the risk of trusting, to decide whether to grant or withdraw trust, it stands to reason that a deception planner should focus on these dimensions—relational and psychological, in order to lessen the "risk" of a target trusting.

While trust may make one susceptible to deception, and a target's trust may be misplaced, it is not reasonable to think that this trust will be sustained. Despite examples throughout the history of deception where targets of deception saw only what they wanted to see, and looked only for ways to confirm their expectations, when presented with sufficient evidence, they realize that their expectations were not met. This explains things such as a person committing trust, having the trust betrayed and subsequently distrusting deceptive politicians. This also explains the limited shelf life of many of the military deception plans.

Deception can also damage credibility. Handel (1982) writes:

> Those who frequently deceive quickly lose credibility; so what they can do one, two, or three times in succession they cannot do indefinitely...as a result they may find themselves in a position in which no state will voluntarily seek any agreements with them, and

> they will force the deceived to be more alert, to have better intelligence, and eventually resort to similar means. (p. 139)

Nations or individuals that frequently deceive are not necessarily better at deception than those who do not routinely engage in deception. Handel (1982) makes the following observation:

> Paradoxically the 'naïve', trusting states may turn out to be much better at the game of deception. One explanation for this is very simple. Someone who is known to be 'naïve' and honest will find it hard to lose his reputation and can therefore cheat and deceive much better when he wants (at least for awhile). (p. 139)

The naïve, honest individual or state is perhaps able to deceive better because they are more trustworthy—the truster may have positive expectations of them fulfilling trust, or they may have demonstrated trustworthiness through reputation. Allied deception in World War II may be an example of this. Handel (1982) notes that this may explain why the British were able to deceive the Germans so easily—the Germans had deceived the British many times in peacetime, so they would not believe that the British would be able to master the art of deception in war (p. 139).

This paper's objectives were to provide the reader with an overview of the topic of trust, examine various theories of deception in order to clarify the relevance of trust to deception operations, and examine various case studies from a trust perspective, particularly focusing on how exploiting or undermining trust may have played a role in the success of the deception. Piotr Sztompka's presents a valuable framework for looking at trust in the selected case studies

of deception, but it cannot be rigidly applied. The case studies show different ways that expectations were taken advantage of, or ways that grounds for trust were manipulated. Most of the expectations that an individual would have of a potential deceiver would fall in the realm of instrumental expectations. These bets of trust incur less risk. It is riskier to expect one to act morally, honorably, or in the interests of another—but someone who possesses these expectations is more vulnerable to deception. All of the reflected and derived grounds for trust are subject to manipulation—in the case studies the most commonly exploited were reputation and appearance, but Barbarossa shows that pre-commitment in the form of a Pact can deceive someone into trusting. There are challenges to manipulating these cues, however. Sztompka (1999) notes that the primary cues require obtaining knowledge about the targets of trust and that this may be easier in certain situations such as close and intimate relationships, also lessening the possibility of deceit. People must also detect and make use of the various cues for them to be effective (Sztompka, 1999). Complexity can make it more difficult to estimate trustworthiness (Sztompka, 1999).

The inclination to trust can also be a product of personal experiences with trust or of history. The idea that a person will be more inclined to trust (or be suspicious) based on past experiences of trust being met or breached is an important concept that should be considered. Sztompka (1999) gives an account of how in Communist Poland, it was appropriate to trust people in the private domain but generally not in the public domain; but even in the public domain, some people were trusted more than others. For

instance, the Army was trusted more than the police and the parliament more that the communist party (p. 100). The difficulty in knowing and interpreting a person's life experiences with trust and the trust culture is shown in the case study analysis. It is unclear how either played a role in the success of a deception—but it is still something that warrants consideration.

Undermining trust has much potential in deception operations. The deception of the FARC was successful due to a man-in-the-middle attack that was partly made possible by the FARC's distrust of normal communication channels and use of couriers or "human envoys." Their distrust led to them using less secure communication channels, making them vulnerable. Often, an individual or state may use a communication channel despite the fact that it is susceptible to being compromised. During World War II, agents were still used despite the fact that many were turned. Computer systems that are vulnerable to attack and monitoring by an adversary are used despite the potential threats.

Undermining trust in organizations can also be very effective. The FBI COINTELPRO destroyed trust in the Ku Klux Klan by undermining expectations and grounds for trust. Making members question the reputation or performance of leaders and highlighting or inventing breaches of trust amongst members or leaders are two ways that this was accomplished. While these particular methods may not be effective on terrorist or extremist organizations, trust is common to all organizations and provides opportunity for manipulation.

Throughout history and in recent conflicts, deception has been used successfully to achieve objectives at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. The study and practice of deception has great value to U.S. forces and should continue to be exercised. A common element in various deception theories is the need to know the enemy in order to confirm his expectations and beliefs with a credible deception story. Additionally, there are common human psychological traits that can aid in analysis. It is important prior to planning and executing deception operations to not only understand what the adversary is thinking, but to also understand the impact that the deception will have on the adversarial mind. Looking at deception, as well as the desired end objectives, with trust in mind can be helpful.

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